The following series is from a publication by Scott V. Truver entitled MINES AND UNDERWATER IEDS IN U.S. PORTS AND WATERWAYS.

FRAMEWORK AND RESPONSIBILITIES
At the federal level, domestic mine/UWIED responsibilities seem to be clear.
Under the 2002 Maritime Transportation Security Act, the Coast Guard, in the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is the lead federal agency for maritime
homeland security (MHLS).19 The Federal Bureau of Investigation, in the
Department of Justice, is the lead agency for terrorism/counterterrorism; Justice’s
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives also figures prominently
in investigations involving explosives. The Navy, in the Department of
Defense, is the lead for mine countermeasures expertise and operations. Below
this strategic context, however, relationships remain murky, and the frameworks—
let alone the formal requirements—for responding to a mine or
UWIED threat at the operational and tactical levels need work.
Under the 2005 National Strategy for Maritime Security, the National Response
Plan, the National Incident Management System and the National Incident
Command System, and the Maritime Operational Threat Response
(MOTR) Plan provide the going-in architecture for MHLS operations. But regional,
state, local, and commercial partners must also be closely integrated and
informed. Indeed, a multiagency, multiple-governmental command, control,
communications, intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance architecture
and response systemis needed for each U.S. port—or at least the seventeen “tier
one” facilities having significant military or economic importance—within the
overall maritime homeland security and maritime domain awareness (MDA)
framework.Mines and UWIEDs collectively represent just one set of the many
threats to the nation’s maritime homeland security, but they are particularly
treacherous, insidious, and deadly—and at this writing in mid-2007 were not
yet included in the Defense Department’s MDA concept of operations. Nevertheless,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Homeland Defense publication in numerous
places does address the threat from mines in U.S. ports and waterways and outlines
the supported and supporting roles in domestic countermining and mine
countermeasures operations.20
The U.S. Coast Guard’s sector commanders, in their roles as “Captains of the
Port” (COTPs) and local Federal Maritime Security Coordinators, will be
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crucial to mine/UWIED defense. Among other vital security and safety functions,
COTPs:
• Establish the port maritime security plans for their respective areas of
responsibility
• Conduct risk-based area security assessments
• Develop area maritime transportation plans
• Have command-control-communications responsibilities and authorities
for MHLS incidents
• Can close ports in the event of emergency
• Provide a vital “bridging function” among the Defense and Navy departments
and regional, state, local, and commercial partners, as a result of the Coast
Guard’s inherent military, civilian, maritime, law enforcement, and humanitarian
character and authorities.
But a Captain of the Port has no capability—or even desire—actually to conduct
MCM operations. Vice Admiral James D. Hull, USCG (Retired), who
served as Atlantic Area Commander, understood well the need to deal with
mines and UWIEDs in American waters, “but that’s primarily the Navy’s responsibility,”
as he later explained.21 “The Navy has the expertise and equipment
to do the job. The real question is whether the Navy’s MCM forces can respond
in the appropriate time to neutralize a no-notice threat.” Of interest in this regard
is the fact that the Coast Guard’s 2007 Strategy forMaritime Safety, Security,
and Stewardship in only two places mentions “water-borne IEDs,” and even
there it limits the concept to a small-boat/bomb threat like the one that attacked
the USS Cole and nowhere mentions mines or underwater IEDs.22 Likewise, the
Coast Guard’s Underwater Terrorism Protection Plan of mid-2007 does not address
mine/UWIED threats or defense requirements.
Since 2003, the Navy and Coast Guard have, however, come together at the
“grassroots” levels to address the mine and UWIED threat. The three LEAD
SHIELD exercises on the West Coast have uncovered surprising capabilities and
strengths but also manymore areas that need close attention, especially commandand-
control relationships involving nonmilitary participants.23 Other war
games conducted by the Office of Naval Research and by the mine warfare program
at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School during 2006–2007 have identified
technological, system, and platform issues that also need focused attention and
sustained funding.24
More, a 2005 memorandum of agreement between the Department of Defense
and the Department of Homeland Security for the inclusion of the Coast
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Guard in support of Maritime Homeland Defense (MHLD) established for
MHLD operations a Defense Department joint command and control structure
that includes Coast Guard forces and identified that service’s MHLD roles, missions,
and functions.25 It recognizes that the Coast Guard “is at all times a military
service and a branch of the armed forces of the United States,” is charged
with maintaining a state of readiness “to function as a specialized service in the
Navy in time of war,” and is “authorized to work closely and cooperatively with
the Navy during peacetime.” The memorandum of agreement also underscores
the Coast Guard’s role “in support of the National Security Strategy while maintaining
its identity as an armed force.”Recognizing also that maritime homeland
defense missions “required flexibility, time-critical response, and immediate access
to a broad spectrum of capabilities and associated forces to ensure mission
success,” it “establishes a standing DoD [Department of Defense]/DHS working
relationship and operational C2 [command and control] construct for conducting
MHLD missions under the authority and command of DoD.”
The next year, the secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security signed a
memorandum of agreement for Defense support to the Coast Guard for maritime
homeland security.26 That memorandum identified and documented appropriate
MHLS capabilities, roles, missions, and functions for the Defense
Department and arrangements to facilitate the rapid transfer of tactical control
of forces to the Coast Guard in support of MHLS operations generally. The
memorandum recognized the constraints on Defense Department support to
law enforcement operations, a consequence of the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act,
which does not affect the Coast Guard.27 It also laid down that the Coast Guard
would have the predominant MHLS role and be the lead federal agency for exercising
law enforcement authorities on waters subject to American jurisdiction
(frominland waters to the extent of the exclusive economic zone) and on, under,
and over the high seas.28 In addition, the memorandum of agreement underscored
the CoastGuard’s role in the armed deterrence of as well as response to acts
of terrorism in the maritime environment. Although it granted the Coast Guard
tactical control over Defense Department forces in maritime homeland defense
operations, it noted that this would not confer “type command” authority;29 all
DoD forces operating under Coast Guard tactical control would remain under
DoD command.
TheMaritime Operational Threat Response Plan and its outline of supported/
supporting relationships are particularly important for defending against mines
and UWIEDs. The plan includes mines in its catalog of threats to U.S. maritime
security and identifying Defense as “the leadMOTR agency for tactical response
and resolution of nation-state threats within the maritime domain,” as well as
for “maritime terrorist threats that occur in the forward maritime areas of
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responsibility.” Further, while the Coast Guard has the lead in responding to
maritime terrorist threats in U.S. waters, clearly the Defense Department has a
major role as a supporting agency.
For domestic MCM operations, then, the Navy’s airborne, surface, and underwater
MCM forces and EOD mine countermeasures assets, particularly the
shallow-water Naval Special Clearance Team (NSCT) 1, with its marine mammals
and UUV MCM systems, will be “chopped” (operationally turned over) to
USCG sector commanders/Captains of the Port, as they have overall command
and control responsibilities for maritime homeland security.
These dedicated MCM forces are being concentrated in Norfolk, Virginia,
and San Diego and Coronado, California; EOD MCM mobile unit detachments
are also based at Charleston, South Carolina, andWhidbey Island,Washington.
In October 2006, the Navy disestablished the Commander,MineWarfare Command,
in Corpus Christi, Texas, and began moving staff to the revamped Naval
Mine and Anti-SubmarineWarfare Command in San Diego.All air, surface, and
underwater MCM and explosive-ordnance-demolition assets will be operating
out of southern Texas in the next few years. That needs to be borne in mind, because
although the airborne MCM helicopter squadrons, EOD MCM mobile
units, and NSCT 1 can be airlifted anywhere in the world within seventy-two
hours or so, assuming overtaxed American strategic airlift assets are available,
and while the helos can self-deploy within the United States, the surface vessels
have top speeds of only ten or twelve knots, making a quick response in most scenarios
problematic.
Under the still-operationalizing “National Fleet” policy, both the Navy and
Coast Guard are looking to innovative solutions to meet current and future requirements
across the spectrum of both services’ roles, missions, and tasks.
(First promulgated by Commandant Admiral James M. Loy and Chief of Naval
Operations Admiral Jay Johnson in September 1998, the National Fleet policy
has since been formally expanded and embraced by subsequent commandants
and CNOs, in 2002 and 2006.)30 For example, the Navy is addressing domestic
MCM requirements and capabilities, and Navy and Coast Guard planners are
developing a joint domestic MCM concept of operations within the MOTR
planning process. But perceptions of the threat and requirements to deal with it
are uneven: in mid-2007, for example, the Department of Defense concept of
operations for maritime domain awareness did not even mention mines,much
less UWIEDs, and there were no formal operational DoD requirements for domestic
mine countermeasures operations.
One of the Coast Guard’s contributions to the National Fleet will be a new
Deployable Operations Group (DOG), championed by Admiral Allen. The concept
calls for a close integration of the Coast Guard’s port security units, the
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National Strike Force, maritime safety and security teams, the Maritime Security
Response Team, and the tactical law enforcement teams into adaptable force
packages that can be surged domestically and internationally to meet emergency
requirements.31
Moreover, these forces will be available not only to Coast Guard operational
commanders but also to other federal agency operational commanders for missions
throughout the United States and overseas high-interest areas. If the new
DOG can be taught some old (and new) MCM tricks, even if no more than
mine-awareness training, the group’s adaptable force packages could be the
Coast Guard’s “surge responders”—complementing the first-responder sector
and COTP personnel already on scene—to an M/UWIED incident well in advance
of Navy mine countermeasures forces that might require several days if
not longer to respond, unless the threat presents itself in or near Charleston,
Norfolk, San Diego, or Whidbey Island.
“But, I’m not sure we’ve done all our homework concerning who could or
should hunt for real weapons,” says Captain Thomas B. Davilli, USN (Retired),
who has extensive airMCMoperational and command experience.32 “One thing
I do know, AMCM, SMCM, and UMCM [airborne, surface, and underwater
MCM] assets are designed and prepared for and take specific procedural measures
to allow them to operate safely in the presence of the threat.Whether others
will have the capability is doubtful,” he continues. “Some players in a recent
war game pointed to a local law enforcement organization that has an EOD-like
response dive team. It might be able to handle an underwater IED, but they are
not diving in low-influence gear. And, the presence of an antitamper countermeasures
device on the mine or UWIED certainly complicates consideration of
manned operations.” Further, “Others have suggested hunting for actual mines
from small craft towing commercial side-scan sonars. The helmsman and other
crew would indeed be patriots! The thought of sending crewed assets into a
mined threat area without signature silencing or some sort of ‘safe track’ procedures
is foolish.”
In July 2007, the Coast Guard announced that it had been training as many as
six hundred police and rescue scuba-team divers to help protect the nation’s
ports, harbors, and waterways against terrorists.33 “For the first time in the industry,
we have a malicious threat to manage,” Steven Orusa of the International
Association of Dive Rescue Specialists has noted. “Any place that has water in its
jurisdiction may have a risk—recreational, commercial, shipping or industrial.”
Some teams have received new equipment, such as underwater robots and sonar
systems. In Jacksonville, Florida, the sixteen-member dive team responsible for
underwater security is part of the sheriff department’s homeland security division.
In the past two years, the team received $596,000 from the Department of
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Homeland Security to buy equipment, including boats, a sonar system, and an
underwater remotely operated vehicle. Kenneth McDaniel, chief of underwater
port security for the Coast Guard, comments that his unit has worked with the
Department of Homeland Security intelligence division to develop a course that
teaches divers how to search for and identify “underwater hazardous devices” or
explosives that might have been placed on ship hulls, bridges, or piers. “We do
underwater hull searches, and we sweep ports,”Orusa, leader of a dive team that
covers Chicago and other Midwest towns, explains. “There’s a whole layer of
skill sets we’ve developed.”
There are concerns, however, should anything but the simplest limpets or
UWIEDs be encountered. Underscoring the importance of appropriate equipment,
preparation, and training, Captain Davilli concludes, “clearly, this is not a
job for well-intentioned amateurs.”