EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Small Vessel Security Strategy (SVSS) exists within the framework of other security strategies. It does not replace any of the current strategies or relevant documents. Rather, this strategy harmonizes directions from related strategies into a multi-layered, unified approach for the component agencies within the DHS, and to lay the groundwork for DHS participation in coordination across all levels of government, as well as other public, private and international stakeholders in the maritime domain. This strategy’s purpose is to address the risk that small vessels1 might be used to smuggle terrorists or WMD into the United States or might be used as either a stand-off weapon platform or as a means of a direct attack with a WBIED. The resulting risks are difficult to manage because small vessels are not centrally registered, operators have not always demonstrated proficiency in small vessel operations, and the ability to screen or detect vessel-borne hazards is extremely limited. There is, moreover, a tradition and expectation among the large population of small vessel operators of largely unrestricted access to U.S. waterways.
This strategy also describes the small vessel community and the environment in which it operates. It discusses and identifies the threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences resulting from four key risk scenarios. Understanding the relationship of the threat, risk, vulnerability, and consequence of a small vessel terrorist attack on the United States will help to reduce the risk of such an attack. The guiding principles and overall goals of this strategy complement existing solutions for large vessels. These have been effective in controlling risk in the operation of larger vessels that fall under the traditional oversight and regulations of commercial operations in international trade. These solutions provide direction, but each solution needs to be creatively adapted to suit the circumstances of small vessels, due to their difference in size, operation, and use compared to larger commercially operated vessels.
This strategy identifies specific goals where efforts can achieve the greatest risk reduction across the breadth of the maritime domain. Its guiding principles are that: solutions shall be risk-based; education and training are the key tools for enhancing security and safety; and economic and national security needs will not be compromised.
The overarching goals of the Small Vessel Security Strategy are to: enhance maritime security and safety based on a coherent framework with a layered, innovative approach; develop and leverage a strong partnership with the small vessel community and public and private sectors in order to enhance maritime domain awareness; leverage technology to enhance the ability to detect, infer intent, and when necessary, interdict small vessels that pose a maritime security threat; and enhance cooperation among international, Federal, state, local, and Tribal partners and the private sector (e.g., marinas, shipyards, small vessel and facility operators), and, in coordination with the Department of State and other relevant federal departments and agencies, international partners. This strategy lays out the appropriate way forward in managing and controlling risks posed by the potential threat and possibly dire consequences of small vessel exploitation.
The private sector performs a central role in Homeland Security and can assist authorities in reducing each of the components of risk (threat, vulnerability, and consequence).
Small vessel operators can be effective partners in detecting threats in our ports and on our waterways. The large number of small vessel operators and their familiarity with the local area and patterns of waterway use make it possible that small vessel operators will be the first to recognize suspicious behavior. DHS must promote and strengthen their effectiveness through public dialogue regarding their role in homeland security and specialized programs such as America’s Waterway Watch. Non governmental organizations are key partners in keeping this dialogue going.
The private sector, through its efforts at securing private facilities from unauthorized entry and other intrusions, plays a key role in reducing our vulnerability to terrorist exploitation of small vessels. Small vessel operators can reduce vulnerability by ensuring their vessels are secure and protected against unauthorized use.
The private sector is the Nation’s primary provider of goods and services and the owner and operator of approximately 85 percent of our critical infrastructure. It is an essential partner in ensuring structural and operational resilience that protects the American people, establishing security around critical infrastructure and key resources, and reporting suspicious activities at work sites that could uncover and ultimately help disrupt terrorist activity.
The private sector is also a critical partner in rebuilding critical infrastructure and key resources affected by a catastrophic incident as well as in fielding scientific and technological advancements that can help secure the United States. Due to the multiple and essential roles the private sector plays across all areas of homeland security, continued collaboration and engagement with the private sector to strengthen small vessel security is imperative.
It is understood that the vast size of the small vessel community makes the efforts to manage and reduce the overall risk in the maritime domain difficult. Yet, it is clear that an effective partnership through the layers of stakeholders and government authorities involved in security operations, and commercial and recreational pursuits, comprises one of the nation’s greatest assets for reduction of small vessel related risks.
1 Small vessels are characterized as any watercraft regardless of method of propulsion, less than 300 gross tons. Although there is no exact correlation between a vessel’s length and its gross tonnage, a vessel of 300 GT is approximately 100 ft in length.